Showing posts with label wine investment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wine investment. Show all posts

Thursday, July 03, 2014

Wine shouldn't be for investment. Should it?

Wine shouldn't be bought for investment; it's for drinking. And no wine should ever cost $1,000.

To which I'd respond, why not? 

I guess it depends whether you accept - as I do - that the laws of supply and demand are as inescapable as the laws of time and gravity. 

Some things are rarer and more desirable than others. the greater the rarity and desirability, the higher their price. And an object - such as a bottle of wine - on offer at an unthinkably high price today, will more than likely command an even higher one in the future.

As is revealed in a recent post on borro.com 

you could have bought this Chanel handbag bag for $2,700 in 2010. For most people, that's a ludicrous price. But so is the $4,400 the same bag commands today. So who is the fool? The woman who has quietly made a 63% return on a four year investment? Or the people who've been struggling to get bank interest rates of 5%?

We could look at all sorts of other examples, ranging from designer dresses to classic cars - up in value by as much as 257% between 2005-2013 and, of course, the kind of London property owned by the same people who decry the crazy rise in the price of fine wine.

Stated bluntly, if you don't want the cost of a bottle of Burgundy to reach four figures, you'd better embrace a world in which the value of your home is pegged at the price you'd get for it today.

Complaining about the rising cost of top wine is like moaning about getting wet when it rains. Entirely understandable, but ultimately totally in vain

Friday, December 13, 2013

Unlucky 13? Why Bordeaux may have to rethink the way it handles its latest vintage


Should the top chateaux of Bordeaux release their 2013 grands vins? Or should they - or at least a number of them - take a stand and offer this vintage under their second labels?
If they do decide to release the 2013 grands vins, should they do so en primeur?


British Master of Wine, Richard Bampfield who works for the negociant and chateau-owning firm of Yvon Mau - and was in Bordeaux during the harvest to see just how challenging it was -  told the Drinks Businesss magazine that he knows "a number of...  savvy producers... that are thinking about not producing a grand vin this year... They know it would be a smart move... A PR coup". 

Responding to comments like these, Christian Seely of AXA, owners of Chateaux Petit Village and Pichon Baron acknowledged (in his blog) that "It would be futile to try to pretend that 2013 is a great or outstandingly good vintage: any such attempt would just lack credibility" The red wines from his properties, however are "good wines, a joyous triumph over adversity, and the best expressions possible of their vineyards in the circumstances of the millesime." And yes, they would be presented en primeur.

I'm sure Seely is right. The AXA chateaux are reliably among the best of every vintage and I'm sure they have indeed produced "good" wines for earlier consumption. But in a world that's full of great wines from a wide range of places, do I need to pay (what will still inevitably be) high prices for his or any other Bordeaux chateaux' "good" wines - however valiant the efforts to overcome adversity? Do I go to a Michelin three-star restaurant to enjoy a "good" meal prepared by a skilled chef who's made the best he could out of second rate ingredients?

Seely makes the point that every Bordeaux vintage is different and has its own personality. This is true. It is also true in Champagne where the grandes marques understand that their customers neither want nor need to experience the fruits of their more "difficult" vintages.  Sauternes, where AXA owns Chateau Suduiraut also has a history of not always coming out with a vintage.

The rationale for releasing a vintage every year (apart from the money it makes the chateaux) is that enthusiasts are ready to buy it - at prices that have gone up significantly in recent years. One of the dirty little secrets in Bordeaux, however, is that the readiness has often had to be driven by blackmail: unless you buy my substandard 2013, you will lose your allocation of the 2014 (which we have't made yet but might well be a repeat of the 2009: another vintage of the century).

Over the last few years, however, the system has stopped working. The Bordelais, buoyed up by sales to China of their 2009s, arrogantly stuck hefty price tags on their 2010s. Only to find that many of their Chinese customers decided not to take delivery of the wine they felt they had been suckered into buying. The negociants still have stock of unsold 2010 in Bordeaux - as, more significantly, do big buyers in China such as C&D who in recent years have been the world's biggest buyers of classed growths. China is suffering from two forms of indigestion. It bought far too much wine in 2010/2011 and it is now living through reforms aimed at cutting down on corruption (classy bottles given as bribes) and conspicuous consumption (classy bottles served as bribes).

The 2010 Bordeaux, however, are very good - arguably in some cases better than the 2009s - so anyone who has these will have no real long term concern about getting rid of them for a very good price. But what of the 2011s? The negociants have huge stocks that they are currently trying to offload at prices that are up to 20% less than they paid for them. Overseas buyers (especially the Chinese) aren't interested, but nor is the traditional dumping ground for hard-to-sell claret: French supermarkets. They already bought the 2011s and are eagerly selling them at prices to make the negociants wince. So, while the French negociant Millesima offers its retail customers 2011 Talbot by the case for for €466; you can head down to your nearest French supermarket pre-Christmas Foire a Vin and pick up a bottle of the same wine for €31.85. Fancy some 2011 Issan? You could give Millesima €562 per case, or buy a bottle from one of those same supermarkets for €37.90. (Prices from Wine-Searcher and le Point).

Although not nearly as good as the 2010, the 2011 was, of course a better vintage than the 2012. Which was, in turn, a better vintage than the 2013. The negociants and supermarkets that are currently desperately trying to dispose of the 2011s know that they've also got the 2012s to force onto an unwilling market. Their eagerness to buy the "good" 2013s is easy to imagine. As is the financial squeeze some of the smaller firms may be facing.
One option for the chateaux would be to offer the 2013s at a knockdown price. But to do this would a) reduce the perceived value of their brand in subsequent vintages and b) make the 2011s and 2012s even more unsaleable. It is easy to understand why Bampfield's "savvy" producers are considering the logic of selling the new vintage under their second labels.



As to whether and why to present these wines en primeur - and more importantly, whether and why anyone should buy them at that point - everything will depend on the price. As the recent Liv-ex chart above shows, people who purchased the top 30 chateaux at the London en primeur release price since 2005 would have lost money or failed to make a return in every vintage except 2007 and 2008. That's not a great track record. The fact that the - less than great - 2007 vintage has yielded a return shows that there can be a logic in buying lesser years as futures, and the en primeur tastings will reveal just how skilful particular chateaux have been at handling adversity. But even Christian Seely will probably admit that getting the wine world to place its money on 13 won't be easy.

Cartoon from cleanfunnypics




Sunday, December 02, 2012

Leveson and wine investment. Self-regulation or statutory control..?

Roll Up! Roll Up! Encouraging words
for potential investors 
on the Vin-X site

Beware! Beware! Another £25m of investors' money
goes down the drain

What do wine investment and the UK newspaper industry have in common? 


Both have been run by some good, and some incompetent, blinkered and downright bad people. And both are in desperate need of regulation.


The Leveson Enquiry has revealed the failings of the press. Earlier this year, Nedim Ailyan, of insolvency specialists Abbott Fielding (and veteran of eight wine company crashes), said on the BBC Radio 4 Money Box programme that some 50 wine investment companies had failed in the last four years. He estimated the collective loss at up to £100m of their investors' cash; last week brought the collapse of Vinance, and probable further investor losses of £25m. 


Victims of both the press and the wine investment ranged from the wealthiest in the land to our next door neighbours. Some of the failed wine companies were simply badly run; some were unlucky; some were downright fraudulent. Many of the victims waved goodbye to savings they could not afford to lose. Many of them knew little or nothing about wine or wine investment and were sucked into parting with their money via cold-calls from plausible-sounding salesmen. 


Both industries need to be reformed; in both cases, reforms are being proposed that raise questions over their capacity for self-regulation.


This week saw the launch of the Wine Investment Association (WIA) - or at least of a consultation document about how such a body should be run. 


Peter Shakeshaft, the man behind this move is head of Vin-X, self-proclaimed (on its Google ad) as "UK's Leading Wine Investment Co" and  (on the Hufffington Post where he writes a column) as "the fastest growing fine wine investment specialist in the UK", and (on the Vin-X site) as "fast becoming one of the industry's foremost commentators". At this stage, the WIA consists of Vin-X; Culver Street, the company launched by Johnny Wheeler following the sale of Lay & Wheeler; Provenance Fine Wines and Albany Portfolio Management. 

The parallels with the debate over press regulation are close.  Like some of Britain's newspaper publishers, Peter Shakeshaft believes (as stated in an online response to blogger Jim Budd's Investdrinks) that "self regulation is by far the best option for all concerned".


He is a stalwart opponent of the FSA (Financial Services Authority) having any role in overseeing wine investment. In this respect Shakeshaft is consistent because he also opposed FSA regulation of stockbroking, another area in which he has experience. In 2010, He was quoted in MoneyMarketing as saying that 

"Over-regulation is putting small-cap stockbrokers out of business"



In Shakeshaft's view, FSA regulation "would stop every merchant up and down the land on the high street selling any wine for investment purpose and would send many out of business!" 

Now let's consider the wine business. What is there about losses of £125m in less than five years that suggests that Britain's wine "high street" merchants are capable of running - or should be trusted to run - wine investment businesses? Where and how did they all develop skills in this field? It does not feature in any WSET courses. Mr Shakeshaft actually acknowledges this, by saying that "We are in discussions with Plumpton college to create a sylabis [sic] for wine investment exams." Which of the lecturers at Plumpton will be taking time off from explaining vine pruning and malolactic to teach the niceties of investment regulation? I wonder.

But Mr Shakeshaft is not a high street wine merchant dealing with a mailing list of regular customers who might be tempted to sink a few pounds into "fine wine". His business, like many others in the field, involves the contacting of complete strangers and persuading them into parting with their cash in return for wine "investment".

As he freely admitted (in responses to Jim Budd's investdrinks-blog) earlier this year, "cold calling... is amongst others, one of our methods to market" (though without "high pressure tactics" he reassuringly says). 

In yesterday's Radio 4 Money Box programme Mr Shakeshaft repeated his belief in the value of cold-calling. In his view, it is unacceptable to make a sale on a first call, but perfectly reasonable to sign a stranger up once they've seen a glossy brochure. (And the Vin-X brochure is a very convincing-looking piece of work, littered with some very compelling statistics).

Cold-calling is directly counter to FSA rules. The WIA may, of course, decide to drop it from its list of permitted activities before its launch in February.


A clear code of conduct that includes this kind of ban and includes - as current proposals do - independent auditing, are clearly steps in the right direction, but proper statutory regulation  that treats wine in the same way as other investments, makes much more sense for the investor - if not for the investment companies. 


One might - reasonably - worry that state control over the press might jeopardise freedom of speech. No such issues apply to statutory control of wine investment. The world survived perfectly well before people thought of entrusting their savings into bottles of fermented grape juice and it would not be a substantially worse place if wine were once again treated as a drink and nobody ever invested in it again 


The WIA is as irrelevant today as a proposal for a revised Press Council run by publishers. 

In June 2013, just four months after the launch of the WIA, the FSA will be replaced by two bodies, the PRA (Prudential Regulation Authority) and FCA (Financial Conduct Authority).  
[I apologize for all these initials]. The PRA will be a subsidiary of the Bank of England and responsible for promoting the "stable and prudent operation of the financial system through regulation of all deposit-taking institutions, insurers and investment banks", while the FCA will be responsible for "regulation of conduct in retail, as well as wholesale, financial markets and the infrastructure that supports those markets [and responsible] for the prudential regulation of firms that do not fall under the PRA’s scope."




Investing in wine is ultimately no different to investments in other goods. As Austin Healey says in a video interview with Peter Shakeshaft on the Vin-X site, "I never taste the wine... it's just a row of figures". If Shakeshaft sees it that way, there is no reason why his, and other wine investment businesses, should not be subject to the same rules as other "row of figures" businesses. This would, incidentally include routine charging of Capital Gains Tax.

"We want an industry that is transparent, safe and open to everyone, not just High Net Worth individuals, the investor's risk should be limited to the individual wine and the market performance and not to the integrity and professionalism of the agent they deal with." A sentiment with which Peter Shakeshaft, its author, and I both agree. We only differ over whether an industry that has failed so badly should be left to regulate itself. I just happen to prefer the Leveson approach.

Anyone with views on this subject may wish to join the consultation process via the WIA site
WIA site - plus access to the consultation papers

They may also care to look at the following links

The FSA views on Cold-Calling
On FSA/FCA/PRA 

On WIA:

Peter Shakeshaft in Huffington Post
Jim Budd 
Decanter
Drinks Business

On Peter Shakeshaft

Motley Fool
The Independent
Disgraced Banker

On Wills & Co, Stockbrokers